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ABSTRACT
This paper examines how ceasefires can influence elements of statehood. It adds 
to scholarship that views statehood as being in a continuous process of change 
by conceptualising international ceasefires as the negotiation of an embryonic 
type of wartime order that has ramifications for how power and authority are 
dispersed among competing actors in civil war. Through the example of the 
Syrian de-escalation zones, the paper suggests that the ceasefire not only affected 
the use of violence but recalibrated relations between international and local 
actors for control over diplomacy, security, territory, and citizenship.
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There has been a wealth of scholarship about how violence shapes the 
actions, relationships, and legitimacy of actors in civil wars.1 Authors have 
pointed out how the use of violence is instrumental in shaping heterarchic 
and hybrid governance systems,2 adds or detracts from the legitimacy non- 
state armed groups are able to call upon at both the local3 and international 
levels4 as well as how it influences relations between armed groups and 
civilians.5 However, rather than focus solely on violence, this paper explores 
the proposition that the construction of order is also implicated in the 
formation of civil war dynamics. While it may initially seem counterintuitive 
to discuss order at the same time as violence and conflict, much of the 
scholarship on wartime order sees the two phenomena as being fundamen-
tally linked.6 As such, there have also been many explorations into how it is 
not only violence that is influential in shaping people’s lives during war but 
also how order is constructed, promulgated, and utilised.7
This article homes in on a particular moment in the codification of order 
during wartime, in the form of a ceasefire agreement, and examines how 
ceasefires can influence elements of statehood. It does this by adding to 
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scholarship that sees statehood not as fixed but rather in a continuous 
process of change.8 In this conceptualisation, statehood is a dynamic process 
of negotiation and contestation for the accumulation of power and authority 
by different actors in both peace and wartime. As Tobias Hagmann and Didier 
Péclard point out, ‘A wide range of actors, state officials and non-state actors 
are involved in “doing the state”’.9 Taking this into account, ceasefires can 
potentially be seen as much more than simply the ‘rules and modalities for 
conflict parties to stop fighting’.10 Ceasefires are actually better conceptua-
lised as the manufacturing and imposition of an embryonic type of wartime 
order on complex political systems.11 As such, they represent a moment of 
codification, through the text of the ceasefire agreement, certain aspects of 
the ever-changing phenomenon of the state that then have implications for 
how power and authority are dispersed on the ground.
Using this work on the dynamic nature of statehood as a starting point, 
I argue that we can move beyond traditional understandings of ceasefires that 
focus primarily on their ability to halt violence12 or as a necessary inclusion in 
broader war to peace transitions13 to see ceasefires as tools used by competing 
actors in civil wars to gain control over resources and areas that best benefit 
their interests.14 While stopping or transforming violence is certainly one 
potential goal of actors negotiating ceasefires, their designs over other areas 
of contested control are also at stake in ceasefire negotiations. These include 
diplomacy, security, institutions of governance, economic networks, territory, 
and citizenship.15 If a multiplicity of actors are engaged in overlapping and 
competing claims to rule, then the particular authority that emerges is thus 
a dynamic product of a process of negotiation.16 Ceasefires arguably provide 
a locus for such statehood negotiation.
The paper is structured in three parts. The first offers a theoretical discus-
sion about how the literature on statehood and ceasefires can be combined 
by highlighting that ceasefires do more than only stop violence but facilitate 
the creation of particular types of wartime order that has ramifications for the 
construction of statehood.17 In the second section, the article examines the 
implications for statehood of an internationally negotiated ceasefire from the 
Syrian civil war and suggests that while the ceasefire was successful in 
decreasing violence for a time, it also affected actors’ control over the con-
tested areas of diplomacy, security, territory, and citizenship. It did this by 
augmenting Russian control over the diplomatic and security arena, Turkish 
control over the territory of northern Syria, and by facilitating reconciliation 
agreements that enabled for the defection of opposition leaders thereby 
consolidating the Syrian government’s control over rebel populations but 
also bolstering the autonomy of militias that could cause future instability. 
The third and final section of the paper uses the Syrian example to more 
thoroughly discuss the interactions between the ceasefire’s international 
signatories and power-plays by actors at the local level as well as the practical 
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implications of such an analysis. The detailed account of the Syrian ceasefire 
and its ramification is based on publicly available documentation such as 
reporting, statements, and policy documents, which is then deepened with 
expert interviews with nine Syrian, Western, and Russian conflict analysts. 
These analysts were chosen because of their ability to provide details about 
some of the underlying processes, motivations, and dynamics surrounding 
the establishment of the ceasefire that are not otherwise visible.18
Ceasefires and statehood
This paper adds to scholarship on the amorphous and evolving nature of 
statehood as advanced by authors such Christian Lund, Tobias Hagmann, and 
Didier Péclard.19 In their conceptualisation, statehood is not only about how 
actors control and wield violence but more related to how authority and 
power are negotiated, gathered and contested by different actors at different 
levels of analysis.20 These processes of ‘negotiation, contestation, and brico-
lage’ are dynamic and always evolving, therefore ‘stateness’ is not static, but 
can wax and wane and is never definitively formed.21 In an environment like 
a civil war where ‘different social forces in society strive for political control 
and domination’,22 the state becomes just one of the many actors competing 
for control over central resources.23
Taking these ideas of statehood as being in a constant process of change as 
a starting point, I add to this literature by thinking through the dynamics that 
ceasefires bring to these systems of complex political order. While there have 
been exceptions,24 so far, the scholarship on ceasefires has tended to see 
violence as something that needs to be ameliorated through the notional 
order a ceasefire offer’s25 or as something to be sequenced between war and 
a peace agreement.26 Consequently, ceasefires have largely been defined and 
considered successful predominantly in terms of their ability to halt violence and 
reduce conflict recidivism rather than having implications for broader types of 
military and political contestations.27 The potential for ceasefires to alter military 
campaigns, such as allowing warring parties the time and space to rearm, 
manoeuvre troops, or resupply is well known.28 It is also understood that conflict 
parties do not always negotiate in good faith but rather use deception and 
sleight of hand in ceasefire negotiations to their own ends.29 However, if we 
apply the logic of the above discussion on the evolving nature of statehood to 
ceasefires, we can see that the order ceasefires create may have a variety of 
consequences for a range of areas of contested control. As such, ceasefires are 
perhaps better conceptualised as a space (or different spaces) of wartime order 
that function as a ‘negotiation table’: a locus where certain aspects of statehood 
are formalised, that have the ability to influence a wide variety of statehood 
dynamics in the ‘negotiation arena’.30
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Conceptualising ceasefire agreements as a locus where elements of state-
hood can be negotiated brings the literatures on statehood and ceasefires 
into closer alignment. The terms of a ceasefire agreement offer signatories 
the chance to formalise their bids for contested areas of control. But, on the 
ground (the negotiation arena), a multiplicity of other actors are also claiming 
the capacity to rule and dominate in contested areas.31 These local dynamics 
may factor into the calculus of the parties negotiating an international cease-
fire agreement or can also potentially muddy their ability to use ceasefires 
solely for their own benefit. As Paul Staniland has suggested, in messy civil 
war environments, bringing parties to the negotiating table is not all about 
negotiating an end to violence, or who wins or loses militarily.32 Rather, 
ceasefire agreements are simultaneously both the formalised outcome of 
negotiations for power and authority (evidenced in the terms of the agree-
ment) as well as a moment that interjects into ongoing contestations for 
power and authority by different actors on the ground.
Ceasefires can certainly also be an attempt by the parties at the negotia-
tion table to move the conflict away from violence or to alter the use of 
violence (e.g. to exercise discipline; to stabilise control over territory/people; 
to ensure coherence within the ranks; or, in pursuit of ideological goals). But, 
in doing so, their aim is also to produce a wartime order that best serves 
a variety of other interests. Such a suggestion is not so controversial – most 
work on mediation is grounded in the rationalist tradition and the theory of 
negotiation costs and benefits.33 The logic is that before entering into talks, 
disputants do an analysis of whether continued fighting is more advanta-
geous than negotiation. My contention is that it is not only the fighting (or 
lack thereof) that disputants are focusing on. Rather, any and every area 
where benefit may arise from exercising control and authority is applied by 
actors to their cost-benefit calculation.
Rather than a bridge between war and peace, ceasefires create an emer-
gent form of order that has the ability to influence the accumulation of power 
and authority by different actors. As such, what they contain and do poten-
tially has an outsized effect on any future peace. This is most starkly illustrated 
in frozen conflicts like North Korea and Cyprus where the evolution of 
political and military systems is based on the formalisation of power and 
authority contained in the ceasefire agreement,34 but the argument also 
holds true in much more dynamic and ongoing conflict environments. 
Ceasefires may create a platform for peace, but in doing so, they also clarify 
the landscape in terms of what are and what are not the important issues at 
stake for different competing parties. Taking this broader view of ceasefires, 
as types of wartime order, enables us to see more clearly which actors and 
what resources are valuable in civil war arenas and this, in turn, has implica-
tions for the negotiation and consequences of any eventual peace.
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The Syrian de-escalation zones and statehood negotiation
The Syrian civil war began in 2011 as a wave of popular protests calling firstly 
for reform, and then eventually for the overthrow of the Assad regime, swept 
across the country. Eight years later the war was declared by the UN’s Human 
Rights Chief Zeid Ra’ad al-Hussein to be the ‘worst man-made disaster since 
World War II’.35 As the war progressed a variety of local, regional and inter-
national actors saw amid the ongoing violence opportunities to assert their 
own plans for dominance.36 These included states such as Russia, Turkey, and 
Iran as well as local elites and non-state armed groups. Likewise, during this 
time, varied attempts were made by different actors towards a negotiated 
political solution. These have included both local level ceasefire 
negotiations37 and international peace processes under the auspices of the 
Arab League, the United States, and the United Nations (the Geneva peace 
process) and the Russians (the Astana–Sochi peace process).
The case of how an internationally negotiated ceasefire that emerged from 
the Russian-led Astana peace process, known as de-escalation zones, pro-
vides a pertinent and contemporary example of the phenomenon of the 
negotiation of statehood through a ceasefire agreement.38 This is firstly 
because the relationships and jostling for power and authority of a variety 
of actors were influenced by the ceasefire. These include the Syrian state, 
international actors like Russia and Turkey, local level militias, non-state 
armed groups, and Syrian citizens. Additionally, in-line with traditional under-
standings of ceasefires, the de-escalation zones were successful in decreasing 
violence initially.39 However, the creation of the four territorially bounded 
ceasefire zones40 did more than halt violence. The ceasefire agreement 
augmented the control of external actors, particularly Russia, over the diplo-
matic and security arena, Turkish control over the territory of northern Syria, 
and dovetailed with local reconciliation agreements with rebel groups to 
bring about the defection of opposition leaders, thereby consolidating the 
Syrian government’s control over rebel populations but simultaneously 
empowering local pro-government militias that are potentially a threat to 
state control.
While a similar lens could be applied to ceasefires in other civil wars, this 
article necessarily focuses on a discrete number of ramifications of the Syrian 
de-escalation zones. Through cases such as Syria’s, we are able to envisage 
a broader approach to conventional understandings about the impact cease-
fires can have on attempts at conflict resolution by adding to debates about 
how ceasefires are implicated in emerging structures of authority and 
broader peace processes, as well as how power-structures are enforced, 
negotiated, and resisted at both the international and local levels. That said, 
it is also important not to overstate the influence of ceasefire agreements. 
While the de-escalation zones certainly assisted and changed the 
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relationships and power dynamics between certain players in Syria’s war, 
agency is ever-present and likewise other military and political events can 
and do occur which have consequences for the same aspects of statehood 
I discuss below.
Diplomatic and security control
Russia’s military involvement in the Syrian civil war began in September 2015, 
when, in order for the Syrian government to survive a tide of military victories 
that increasingly favoured the armed opposition, it invited Russia into the 
country to assist with its war effort. Russia’s intervention succeeded in turning 
the military and political tides of the war. The retaking of Aleppo in 
December 2016, Syria’s second-largest city and a key business hub, was 
crucial because it, ‘set the stage for the current configuration of the peace 
process’.41 As battlefield dynamics once again began to favour the Syrian 
government, the UN-led Geneva peace process also stalled. This was in large 
part due to the fact that its primary backer, the United States, had shifted its 
focus away from the Syrian opposition movement towards combatting the 
Islamic State in the east of the country. These diplomatic machinations at the 
international level coupled with Russia’s dominance on the ground in Syria 
allowing it to assert control over both the military dynamics and the politics 
of the peace process. This manifested in the Astana–Sochi peace process. In 
effectively sidelining Geneva, ‘Astana represents Russian pre-eminence in the 
Syrian conflict’s political process’.42 While being touted as complementary to 
Geneva, Astana changed the basic tenets of political negotiations. Rather 
than the ousting of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad as a pre-requisite for 
peace, ‘Russia’s political process for Syria has always been anchored to the 
Syrian state. It was never about negotiating regime change or a transitional 
government’.43
Despite talks being supposedly centred around the primacy of the Syrian 
government, the de-escalation zone agreement that emerged from the 
Astana peace process in May 2017 had ramifications for Syrian diplomacy 
and affected broader security dimensions of the civil war. This is because the 
Syrian government was neither a signatory to nor directly involved in nego-
tiating the de-escalation zones.44 Instead, Russia, Turkey, and Iran made the 
agreement on behalf of the Syrian government. These three external actors 
essentially negotiated and agreed to conditions that curtail Syrian diplomacy 
and its ability to influence events within its territory. Through a term relating 
to the establishment and functioning of checkpoints and observation posts 
on the perimeter of the de-escalation zones, Russia particularly has augmen-
ted the presence of its Military Police on the ground, allowing it a more 
granular level of control over local-level dynamics.
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The Russian Military Police are overwhelmingly Sunni Muslims from 
Russian states in the north Caucuses such as Ingushetia and Chechnya. 
Members of the Syrian armed opposition were reportedly surprised at seeing 
Sunni prayer rites being performed by the Russian Military Police on the 
road.45 These very visual displays of religious solidarity proved successful in 
establishing a level of trust with opposition groups as the police were 
perceived by many armed groups as non-sectarian and therefore not as 
risky to deal with as the Syrian government or Iran.46 As per the text of the 
ceasefire agreement, the Military Police operated checkpoints and observa-
tion posts on the permitters of the de-escalation zones, such as Dar al-Kabira 
in the Northern Homs de-escalation zone, around the southern zone and in 
the northern zone of Idlib. As such, the police were able to facilitate the flow 
of goods into de-escalation areas which also endeared them with local armed 
groups and populations. A member of the Russian military operating out of 
Hmeimen airbase in Latakia said that Russia, ‘has good relations with non- 
state armed groups, in some cases better relations with them than the 
[Syrian] regime’.47
Broader level security control in Syria also now depends in some part on 
the commitment of the ceasefires three external signatories.48 For example, 
Russia underwrites the Fifth Corps – an amalgam of local paramilitary groups, 
while the National Defense Forces come under Iranian leadership.49 Likewise, 
many areas are now controlled by powerful militia figures that were ‘con-
structed directly from the inner-sanctum of the Syrian regime’50 but in many 
ways operating independently of it.51 The most well known of these is the 
Tiger Forces, led by Airforce Intelligence Brigadier General Suheil al-Hasan52 
and the Desert Hawks led by brothers General Mohammad and Ayman Jaber. 
Until recently, the Jaber’s neatly straddled the divide between regime loyal-
ists, business elites with long-time interests in Syria’s oil deposits and private 
militia leaders.53 In 2013 they set up an armed group which acted as a security 
company to defend their oil trucks that essentially became more akin to 
a private army as the war progressed.54
One conflict analyst put it this way: ‘I wouldn’t call then warlords – more 
somewhere between warlords and gangsters’.55 The implementation of the 
de-escalation zone facilitated the authority and control of many of these 
groups over certain geographical areas (mostly in the de-escalation areas) 
and meant the Syrian government has been unable to exercise hegemonic 
domination at the local level. This represents both a source of embarrassment 
for the Syrian government and a genuine threat, i.e. that these groups will 
eventually take up arms against the state.56 As one analyst put it, ‘You do not 
keep semi-hostile forces close if you have the means to destroy them’.57 
Because the government does not currently have the ability to reassert its 
own exclusive control over all the territory of the de-escalation areas or the 
material and financial resources needed to keep local level militia 
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commanders in check, it recognises that a way to prevent further large-scale 
insurrection is to turn a blind eye to local criminality and graft gleaned from 
local populations, particularly in the newly acquired de-escalation zones.58 ‘If 
you can’t keep [militia] groups happy, you need to allow them to generate 
their own resources in criminal ways which make the population unhappy’.59 
As such, it appears that Assad’s ability to control such groups in large part 
depends on his ability to pay fighters either out of his own pocket or from the 
pockets of Syrian citizens.60
In its efforts to survive, the Syrian government relinquished full authority 
and control of statehood in the diplomatic and security realms, arguably 
expecting that when the dynamics of the war had shifted more fully in its 
favour they would be returned.61 While the control over Syrian statehood by 
other actors does not encompass the entirety of the state, certainly the Syrian 
government’s ability to influence and control international diplomacy and 
local security dynamics has been impacted in fundamental ways by the de- 
escalation zone ceasefire agreement. The de-escalation zones have interacted 
with local dynamics to create a ‘mosaic of security control’ not limited to the 
Syrian state.62 As the concept of a negotiation table that acts as a locus point 
for negotiating elements of statehood suggests, the de-escalation zone 
agreement converted the power configuration between the Syrian govern-
ment and the ceasefire signatories into something more official and orderly. 
However, in spelling out the establishment of the de-escalation and security 
zones, checkpoints and observation posts administered by the ceasefire 
signatories, the ceasefire agreement codified a level of territorial and political 
control over Syrian statehood by external and non-state actors. To be clear, 
ambiguities and contestations existed in the Turkish/Russian/Iranian/Syrian 
relationship before the de-escalation zones – the de-escalation zones did not 
drive that process, which were the result of battleground dynamics and 
military necessity. But, the ceasefire formalised that framework and recali-
brated statehood dynamics. Simply put, the ceasefire didn’t necessarily 
change winners and losers but changed the distribution of power and 
authority.
Control over territory and citizenship
The de-escalation zone agreement and its subsequent dynamics effectively 
made ‘Idlib [a province in northern Syria and one of the four designated de- 
escalation zones] a Turkish problem’.63 The formalisation of the Idlib zone 
through the terms of the ceasefire dovetailed with local reconciliation agree-
ments which brought the three other de-escalation areas back under Syrian 
control. The agreement also enabled a messy form of Turkish statehood over 
the northern Syrian province of Idlib by officialising Turkey’s role in policing 
the non-state armed groups operating there.64
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In the creation of the four de-escalation zones, Idlib became ‘the dumping 
ground’ for opposition fighters from the other three zones unwilling to be 
reconciled with the Syrian government.65 These reconciliation deals (itifaqaat 
al-musalaha) go hand in hand with the internationally negotiated ceasefire.66 
The local deals come in two broad types – ‘hard’ and ‘soft’67 but ‘the template 
is not rocket science. The strong party tells the weaker ones you can either die 
here or surrender’.68 While they are both more akin to a forced surrender than 
any sort of negotiated settlement, the type can have different ramifications 
for individuals and communities.69 Overall, however, whether in the short or 
longer term, the primary aim of these local agreements has been to gain 
control over territory and certain Syrian citizens.
The reconciliation process for three of the four de-escalation zones was 
completed between March and July 2018.70 As of the beginning of 2019 
when this article was written, only the Idlib zone remains. ‘There was 
a meaningful demonstration effect in the sequencing of the areas that fell’, 
said a conflict analyst I interviewed who is based in Beirut.71 The Eastern 
Ghouta zone was the first to surrender to the Syrian government in 
March 2018. However, the fall of ‘Ghouta had an outsized psychological 
impact’ on the opposition in the other zones.72 While there may have been 
an initial decrease in violence across the de-escalation zones, the Syrian 
government’s subsequent siege, bombardment, alleged use of chemical 
weapons in Eastern Ghouta coupled with the lack-lustre international 
response ‘was clarifying in terms of how far international “friends” would be 
prepared to go for other [de-escalation] areas’.73 The answer was not far.
This meant that after Ghouta agreed to a reconciliation deal, rebel leaders in 
the remaining zones were left in a difficult position. Making a soft reconciliation 
deal with the government notionally meant survival. The opposition leaders 
and their cadres would be subsumed into the Fifth Corps (a pro-government 
army division consisting of volunteers mainly from reconciled areas organised 
by Russia)74 and would therefore have the ability to remain in the local area in 
order to defend and represent family and local constituents. While this could 
mean being branded as power-hungry opportunists (difda’ or ‘frogs’ in local 
parlance), for many it seemed like a preferable option to their communities 
being left to the whims of untrustworthy outsiders.75 Alternatively, a hard 
reconciliation meant certain displacement to the Idlib de-escalation zone, 
‘being yanked from family and home, becoming a Turkish mercenary, being 
gobbled up by jihadists or living in a really awful IDP camp’.76
Unsurprisingly given the stakes, many rebel leaders were quick to jump 
ship for both self-serving and more noble reasons. Ahmad al-Awdeh, leader 
of the opposition’s Shabab a-Sunnah faction, became one of the earliest to 
capitulate to a soft reconciliation deal in the southern de-escalation zone and 
went on to become a Fifth Corps volunteer in the eastern Dara’a countryside, 
where he was from.77 Likewise, Omar Melhem, a former colonel in the Syrian 
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army-cum-rebel commander from Talbiseh in the northern Homs zone, sur-
rendered to the government in order to be allowed to stay in his hometown 
rather than being exiled to Idlib.78 Other notable individuals such as Sufi 
preacher Bassam Difdaa from Eastern Ghouta seem to have joined the 
opposition movement at the outset of the uprisings but took the opportunity 
to change allegiances back to the government once reconciliation became 
more likely by virtue of the de-escalation zones.79
Nevertheless, as with the mortgaged control over aspects of diplomacy 
and security, soft reconciliations are envisaged by the Syrian government to 
be temporary – ‘it is not something the regime will tolerate in the long- 
term’.80 Already, government transgressions of the terms of reconciliation 
agreements are prevalent.81 For example, rebel leaders in some soft recon-
ciled areas were sent to fight for the Syrian government in other areas anyway 
when they failed to provide more volunteers for the Fifth Corps.82 Some have 
even been disappeared or executed despite the deals purportedly giving 
them the opportunity to transition to life back under government control 
without penalty.83 Likewise, life in all reconciled areas remains highly securi-
tised. Service provision remains minimal, men are banned from leaving the 
area and some are being told by the government that they now have to pay 
taxes dating back to 2011, the start of the uprising.84
The existence of the Idlib zone allowed de-escalation and reconciliation in the 
other three areas to be so effective. The Idlib zone is therefore different in 
character from the other three areas not only because the non-state armed 
groups are much stronger but also because of Turkey’s role, under the auspices 
of the ceasefire agreement, in policing the two largest rebel groups operating 
there, the Syrian National Army and one-time al-Qaeda affiliate Hayat Tahrir al- 
Sham. Ankara has taken on this role for a variety of reasons. In large part it is to 
control the flow of refugees over the border it shares with Idlib; to limit the 
activities of jihadi actors on its own soil; and, to control what it perceives as the 
Kurdish threat.85
Over the Syrian National Army, an amalgamation of various opposition armed 
groups, Turkey has full control. ‘They [the Syrian National Army] are too depen-
dent on Turkey to abandon the agreement Turkey made [about the de- 
escalation zone]’.86 In practice this means paying the salaries of fighters, provid-
ing material support (i.e. equipment and logistics) and controlling access into and 
out of Turkey for commanders and family members in what has effectively 
become their rear-base.87 While there have been more recent changes, up 
until the end of 2018, they seemed to operate in a traditional proxy relationship 
offering Turkey relatively free rein in Idlib.88 As one conflict researcher based in 
France put it, ‘Turkey is the only reason rebels still control any of Syria’.89
What makes Turkey’s complete control over Idlib messy is the ongoing 
presence of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. This is because Hayat Tahrir al-Sham is less 
dependent on Turkey, allegedly receiving support from Saudi Arabia and 
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Qatar, but also because the nature of the relationship is less well delineated.90 
There is some cooperation (e.g. Turkish troops can pass through areas con-
trolled by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham) but it is more like ‘negotiation with a dagger 
behind the back’.91 The ceasefire agreement tasked Turkey with separating 
and demilitarising jihadists like Hayat Tahrir al-Sham in Idlib from supposedly 
more moderate elements like the Syrian National Army. While since July 2017 
the two groups have had more discrete territorial control in Idlib, in practice it 
remains a difficult proposition for a state that supposedly has little appetite 
for a military confrontation to disarm a powerful non-state armed group in 
a non-coercive way.92 While Turkey potentially ‘has more control over Hayat 
Tahrir al-Sham than it will admit’,93 it does have communication channels that 
remain largely based around notifications and ultimatums making it difficult 
for the two to come to any sort of larger arrangements around who controls 
what.94 Essentially, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham controls the Idlib territory but it 
operates within a Turkish-led order and struggles to maintain full 
autonomy.95 A conflict analyst I interviewed added that ‘to an extent this is 
true for every armed group in Syria, but in this case it’s very clear’.96
While other conflict dynamics are also no doubt implicated, the creation of 
the de-escalation zones has essentially contributed to the redistribution of 
Syrian territorial control and gone hand in hand with the reconciliation 
strategy at the local level which necessitated that the Idlib zone is reserved 
for those the Syrian government considers undesirable. From the perspective 
of its international signatories, the confluence of the de-escalation zones with 
local reconciliation agreements achieved their goal of ‘isolating the terrorist, 
jihadi problem in one pocket’.97 For more local level actors such as the various 
smaller armed opposition groups, the creation of the de-escalation zones 
offered a way to capitulate without dying or relocate if they were unable, 
ideologically or practically, to reconcile with the Syrian state. It also offered 
local elites-cum-militia leaders a way of augmenting their authority and 
control over the spoils of newly-reconciled areas.
Ceasefire agreements as locus of statehood negotiation
This paper aims to broaden our understanding of how ceasefire negotiations not 
only relate to military dynamics but how they may influence elements of state-
hood. Suggesting that actors use ceasefires to advance their own positions and/ 
or settle their own military conflicts is unremarkable. However, what is a value- 
add to existing knowledge is better interrogating how decisions relating to wars 
‘master’ cleavages, such as international ceasefire negotiations, affect the local 
level98 and likewise, how ceasefires can be conceptualised as types of wartime 
order that have the ability to recalibrate control and authority. The Syrian case 
discussed above shows how the de-escalation zones not only affected the use of 
SMALL WARS & INSURGENCIES 1405
violence but became a locus for negotiating different aspects of statehood such 
as diplomacy, security, territory, and citizenship.
It is certainly possible that the creation of the de-escalation zones and their 
associated dynamics did not change the ultimate trajectory of the Syrian war. 
Even if the zones enabled some recognition of aspiring sovereigns, in realpolitik 
terms, the ceasefire was merely a prelude to the Assad government and its 
allies retaking control over most of the country. An argument can be made that 
the ceasefire was used cynically to successfully advance the aims of the wars’ 
most powerful players. But, I believe that high politics and military craft are not 
the only salient dynamics of civil wars. The analysis offered above shows that 
what ceasefires contain (i.e. their text) and the actions they spawn on the 
ground can have very real effects on who are (or who become) the major 
players in the post-war environment, and likewise, who has been excluded and 
may potentially be in need of additional assistance and oversight.
Taking the microdynamics that ceasefires can generate into account has two 
main practical ramifications. The first is to show that remaining fixated on 
measuring the success of ceasefires by how they are able to halt violence or as 
a political platform for peace, blinds us to a wide range of other consequences 
ceasefires generate. Understanding how ceasefires can influence a range of 
contested areas of statehood such as relationships between ‘sovereign 
aspirants’,99 power-grabs for important state resources and conflict dynamics 
means that we are better able to conceptualise their potential and hopefully 
understand their results. Pragmatically, this means that during peace-building 
activities, such as security sector reform, property reconstruction efforts, refugee 
returns, or constitution drafting, post-conflict planners can understand more 
about the nature of, and relationships between, actors that are likely to wield 
authority. Therefore, the making of any truly inclusive peace may have its roots 
not just in the peace agreement, but in the ceasefire that likely preceded it.
The corollary is that through the analysis of how the Astana de-escalation 
zones affected statehood dynamics in Syria we can begin to comprehend the 
myriad institutions, practices, and actors involved in asserting power and 
authority not only during times of violence in civil war but also during 
notional times of order, such as ceasefires. While many of these processes 
were happening prior to Astana, the creation of the de-escalation zones was 
not only the ‘formalisation of the strategic reality on the ground’.100 Instead, 
they interjected into these realities, altering and recalibrating the relation-
ships between nodes and networks of power. While ‘not everything is or can 
be negotiated and not everyone takes part in negotiating statehood’,101 
nevertheless, the results of diplomatic processes, including ceasefires, can 
be seen as one means by which powerful groups try to exercise domination 
over weaker ones at varying levels of analysis.102
As the Syrian case shows, the de-escalation zones may have lowered kinetic 
activity but they also enabled the recalibration of power and authority in 
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numerous other areas of contested statehood. These included the strategic 
implementation of a military and political strategy aimed at both recapturing 
territory and subsuming former opposition leaders and citizens back into the 
state as forced ‘collaborators’103; empowered militia leaders as aspiring sover-
eigns; simultaneously allowed for the Syrian government to assert greater 
control over certain territorial areas while denying it in others; and allowed 
for personal interactions between Russian Military Police and rebels to occur 
thereby augmenting Russian control of the security space. Overall, in civil wars 
such as Syria’s, the negotiation of international ceasefires brings to the fore 
jostling and machinations for authority by different players and can act as 
a nexus to show how international and local levels feedback on one another, 
potentially affecting subsequent negotiations or any eventual peace.
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